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Chapter 1  
Lives That Slide Out of View  
“Vivas to those who have fail’d” Walt Whitman, Song of Myself (1885). 
 
Lives that Slide out of View concerns the origins and fates of Critical Legal Studies (CLS).1 
Against the usual conventions, the book presents CLS as a philosophy of activism, located on 
a particular fault line that runs through American radical culture from the new left
2
 to the 
welfare rights movement. The central argument is that the politics of the movement are 
                                                          
1  
Thus, we are very much concerned with a way of re-thinking CLS, its location and cultural legacies. CLS is 
perhaps best conceived of as a left leaning grouping of scholars based in university law schools. Standard 
accounts of CLS trace one line of inheritance back to American Legal Realism and the historical context of the 
New Deal, but this does tend to obscure the relationship between the new left and CLS. Although the first 
Conference on Critical Legal Studies at the University of Wisconsin did not take place until 1977, CLS was 
rooted in the radical politics of the 1960 (Duxbury, 1985, p.432).  CLS scholars tended to see law as political; 
claims to legal autonomy and neutrality effectively concealed law’s role in social control and the ideological 
construction of private property, the market and bourgeois order. This thesis took a slightly different form in 
arguments about legal indeterminacy. Not only could legal doctrine be considered fractured and ambiguous, law 
itself could never be properly delineated from politics. Our main concern in this footnote is not to define CLS, 
but to look at a particular theme in the history of the movement. The conventional account of CLS presents it as 
prone to splits that began with the creation of a distinct group of feminist critical legal scholars. Feminist critical 
legal thinking has its roots in feminist streams organised at a 1983 conference on CLS, but its proper origins can 
be traced to a specifically feminist CLS conference in 1985. Critical legal feminism “began in reaction to a 
radical and mostly, but not exclusively, male vision of an alternative conception of society” (Menkel-Meadow, 
1988, p.63). Feminist scholars were keen to develop their position against ‘classic’ CLS. For instance, Menkel-
Meadow argued that the feminist approach is committed to the “experiential point of view” as seen from the 
perspective of the “oppressed, dominated, and devalued” (Menkel-Meadow, 1988, p.63). The next significant 
split came in the late 1980s. Critical Race Theory’s founding moment can probably be traced to its first 
conference in 1989. Scholars of colour reacted to the “white patriarchs” who ran “the movement” (Goldfarb, 
1992, p.685). White feminism was also a target of critique. CRT can thus be seen as a ‘critique of the critique.’ 
Consider Williams’ celebrated criticisms of CLS.  She castigated ‘classical’ CLS as stemming from the “the 
white left’s” inability to know what it means to be black. Critical Race Theorists wanted to “look to one’s own” 
(Cooke, 1989). This argument itself breaks down into two positions: one which sought to build black 
consciousness, and one whose energies went into identifying the interests and ‘essence’ of racist oppression. 
However, in the mid-1990s, CRT was itself subjected to a “fracturing” by LatCrit (Frug, 1992, p.1051).  LatCrit 
subjected CRT to critique- in particular its focus on discrimination as a “black white binary” as a way of 
understanding discrimination and marginalisation (Gines, 2013). LatCrit’s own “inward turn” further questioned 
“subdivision within outsider groups that at one time saw themselves as unitary” (Delgado, 1993, p. 753). LatCrit 
scholarship is also marked by a distinct turn to Queer Theory in order to understand the homophobia of Latino 
cultures (Valdes 1997).  Histories of CLS, CRT and LatCrit can be found in R. West (1986); Dalton (1987); 
Delgado (1987); Matsuda (1987); Goldfarb (1992) and Hernández-Truyol et al (2006). Bauman presents a 
slightly different approach. Not only has “the story of the critical legal studies movement’s genesis and 
growth…not yet been definitively told” (Bauman, 2002, p.4) but “the place of the Movement” has been 
downplayed (Bauman, 1988, p.352). We would thus follow Bauman and take issue with Cornel West’s 
positioning of CLS. West accused CLS of parting company with “nonacademic prophetic and progressive 
organized efforts to transform American culture and society” (C.West, 1988, p.270). He argues that CLS 
required a turn to Gramsci and a movement away from Foucault. This is certainly a compelling approach. 
However, the genealogy presented in this book suggests a different cultural location of CLS. Whilst we touch 
upon certain themes that might resonate with West’s notion of the prophetic, this concept is not used to organise 
the argument of Lives That Slide Out of View. There is, nevertheless, an ongoing dialogue (explicit or implicit) 
with Cornel West that runs through its pages, particularly around the relationship of critical legal thought to 
liberalism and West’s reading of Unger. The engagement with Dewey owes a debt to West (1989); as does the 
reading of Marx and the Marxist tradition and the orientation to existentialism (C. West, 1991). 
2
 We will concentrate on Students for a Democratic Society [SDS].  Whilst the SDS was not entirely 
synonymous with the new left, it was arguably the most influential. See chapter 2 for a more extended 
discussion of the SDS and the new left.  
essential if we want to grasp a peculiar continuation of CLS, tentatively called critical legal 
theory.3 If there is such a thing as critical legal theory then it might be seen as a political and 
philosophical engagement with the constitutive social divisions that articulate market 
capitalism.   
 
For the purposes of our argument we will follow the various ‘splits’ in the American critical 
legal tradition between feminism, Critical Race Theory and LatCrit- but we want to suggest 
that mainstream accounts of CLS misunderstand the fundamental continuity of critical legal 
thought. Indeed, it is now necessary to read the critical tradition in reverse from the 
perspective of LatCrit and ClassCrit.
4
 To this end, we will also follow the boundary that 
exists between critical legal thinking and its nearest cousin or neighbour, progressive 
constitutionalism.
5
 For example, we can hear the dim echoes of street protests in 
Michelman’s sophisticated moral philosophy. The critical legal tradition and progressive 
constitutionalism share a fundamental concern with poverty. Poverty is the leading edge of a 
movement of thought that holds together engagements with welfare rights, democracy and 
activism.  
                                                          
3 
 The movement was a term used by those involved in the SDS, the NWRO and Critical Legal Studies as a way 
of identifying themselves. The fact that this term extends from new left and anti-poverty activism to CLS 
suggests the peculiar kind of genealogy that this books sets out to study. However, this is not meant to suggest 
that there was any real continuity between these different groupings, other than passionate modes of self-
identification. Critical legal theory is not as recognised a term as Critical Legal Studies. Chapter 10 attempts to 
sketch out how critical legal theory might be understood.  
4 
ClassCrit can be traced back to workshops held at the University of Buffalo in 2007. A grouping of scholars 
drawing on the legacies of CLS and CRT, the ClassCrits also have ongoing associations with LatCrit. Thus, 
ClassCrit can be seen as one of the mediating ‘points’ between critical legal traditions of thought, and a key site 
for creative thinking on Marx. For a general overview of ClassCrit, see M. Grahn-Farley (2008), Mutua (2008), 
Kessler (2008), M.Mutua (2008) and Mahoney (2009).   
5 
Although the concept of progressive constitutionalism is somewhat disputed, there is sufficient agreement to 
make it a useful term – if only to catch a certain mood in constitutional scholarship. As a general, catch all 
definition, Lipkin offers the idea that progressive approaches to the constitution seek “to improve the chances of 
authentic self-definitions for all Americans” through “interventions in both private and public affairs that neither 
liberals nor conservatives would be happy to countenance” (Lipkin, 1999, p. v). In keeping with at least some of 
the arguments presented in this book, progressive constitutionalism communicates with legacies of new left 
thought. Perhaps West’s view of progressive constitutionalism resonates most clearly with the values that can be 
associated with the new left. She asserts that: “[p]rogressivism is…a particular moral and political response to 
the sadness of lesser lives” that have been “unnecessarily diminished by economic, psychic and physical 
insecurity in the midst of a society or world that offers plenty” (R. West, 1999, p. 1). Progressive 
constitutionalism, as a “moral response to suffering” draws its energy from “collective action” and is aimed at 
“ameliorating the suffering that is consequent to private maldistributions of wealth and security” (R. West, 
1999, p.3). Thus, the “normative antiauthoritarian aspirations” that characterise at least one of the anima of 
progressive constitutionalism could be traced back to the new left (Cohen and Alberstein, 2011, p.1086). At the 
same time, the progressive fear of “backlash” and distrust of the supreme court might also suggest that the 
concept of progressive constitutionalism is itself a critical response to the militancy of the movement 
(Spindelman, 2011, p.1116). Progressive constitutionalism is a broad church. Some scholars associated with 
progressive constitutionalism distance their work from any links with the new left. For instance, Tushnet’s 
nuanced version of progressive constitutionalism shares with scholars like Robin West the concern with “racial 
justice” and forwarding “public policies aimed at improving the material conditions of those suffering “severe 
deprivation” (Tushnet, 2011, p. 1074). However, Tushnet also argues that progressive constitutionalism need 
not be egalitarian, provided it takes seriously the question of how “severe material deprivation” can be reduced 
as far as possible (Tushnet, 2011, pp.1075-1076). We will follow these concerns throughout the book. We will 
bracket Michelman’s work under the general rubric of progressive constitutionalism, even though he is 
somewhat critical of the term. This approach is justified in terms of our argument as it indicates the complex 
legacies at play in Michelman’s constitutionalism. It is also worth pointing out that our argument does not assert 
that the NWRO must be seen as central to either progressive, popular or democratic constitutionalism. Our point 
is merely that these currents of scholarship carry forward certain memories of the movement, repressed or 
otherwise.  
 The book’s argument is organized around three key terms: alienation, praxis and ethics. 
Activism is understood through this network of themes. Our approach to alienation takes its 
basic orientating points from Marx.6 In crudest summary: to understand poverty it is 
necessary to grasp alienation. Alienation, and the closely related term reification, have largely 
disappeared from contemporary legal critique. One objective of Lives that Slide out of View is 
to re-open debate around these ideas. 
 
Alienation must be located within a particular critique of American monopoly capitalism. In 
distinction to the forms of mechanised mass production that defined classical capitalism, 
decent wages and expanding consumer markets are essential to cycles of 
production/consumption in monopoly capitalism. Thus the new problematic of alienation is 
that of the worker as consumer in a post scarcity society.7 Baran and Sweezy provided the 
                                                          
6
 In the discussion that follows, we make a distinction between Marx’s understanding of a capitalist mode of 
production and a more precise understanding of American capitalism as monopoly capitalism. A capitalist mode 
of production operates to specific and immanent logics. From a historical perspective, we are concerned with a 
process that can be dated to the sixteenth century and the creation of ‘a world-embracing commerce and a 
world-embracing market’ (Marx, 1975, p.247). From a more technical and economic sense, the process of self 
valorization is peculiar to capitalism. This is itself a complex idea, but can be simply put as follows. The 
capitalist does not seek to make a profit on a single transaction but to realise the “restless never-ending process 
of profit-making alone” (Marx, 1975, p.254). The capitalist throws his money into circulation, in the hope that it 
will be endlessly augmented. Capital itself thus appears to be “an independent substance, endowed with a 
motion of its own, passing through a life-process of its own, in which money and commodities are mere forms 
which it assumes and casts off in turn” (Marx, 1975, p.251). This is clearly an inadequate description of Marx’s 
understanding of capital. However, in very general outline it traces the fundamental relationship between a 
capitalist mode of production and alienated labour. A capitalist mode of production “subordinates human needs 
to the profit motive.” This has certain economic effects: ‘trigger[ing] crises and contradictions’ that, in turn, 
‘limit the scope for the reproduction of capital’ (Saad-Filho and Fine, 2004, p.89). Capitalism articulates a form 
of human being defined by a capitalist mode of production. This analysis is based on a reading of The 1844 
Manuscripts. The concept of alienation comes out of a reflection on the social degradation of a world reduced to 
a form of economics: “the devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing values of the 
world of things” (Marx, 1977, p. 68). In most general terms, the worker is alienated from the product of his/her 
labour (as something produced for someone else); alienated from the process of production, or from work itself- 
and- as a “deduction” from these first two features of the phenomenon, alienated from species being. This is the 
most central part of the theory of alienation we want to carry forward. Species being addresses problem of 
meaning, or, more specifically, human meaning. See, below in footnote 8. In general, our argument follows 
Mészáros, Sayers and Ollman to the extent that it sees alienation as a theme that runs through Marx’s work. 
Whilst its presence in Capital is not as pronounced as certain earlier texts, this does not mean that the concept is 
absent in Marx’s mature critique of political economy- or even in the work of those, such as Baran and Sweezy, 
who develop a more contemporary understanding of monopoly capitalism (Mészáros, 2005).  
7 
The concept of monopoly capital was important to the new left as it appeared to identify the nature of the 
massive surplus of wealth created by American capitalism in the post war period: “always too much never too 
little” (Baran and Sweezy, 1966, p.114). The “engine “that produce[d] [the] surplus are “giant corporations”-  no 
longer under the control of single families but a managerial elite (Baran and Sweezy, 1966, p. 58). The 
monopolistic tendencies of giant corporations prevent markets operating rationally.  The key concern is thus the 
“generation and absorption” of corporate profits” (Baran and Sweezy, 1966, p. 77). Provided that corporations 
can divide up the market to their own satisfaction, the surplus they generate from their activities can continue to 
grow (Baran and Sweezy, 1966, p. 77). However, the “contradiction” in monopoly capitalism is that whilst it 
produces “ever greater surpluses” it “fails to provide the consumption and investment outlets” that would 
“absorb” the surpluses and allow the economic system to continue functioning.  This leads to various 
pathologies such as unemployment and business failure (Baran and Sweezy, 1966, p. 114). The state has a 
central role in ensuring that the economy serves the interests of powerful economic actors. Baran and Sweezy’s 
discussion of the changing form of the American state in the period of the New Deal suggest that government 
spending was a way of dealing with the crisis of the Great Depression. Despite the liberal argument that 
“inadequate surplus absorption could be solved by…increased government spending for welfare purposes”, the 
basic forms of the critique of consumerism: the more one consumed, the more one sought 
satisfaction through further consumption (Baran and Sweezy 1964). Alienation is thus linked 
with a network of phenomena around the numbing loss of meaning in an administered 
society. Consumerism also conceals the racism and sexual division of labour that define a 
particular social structure of waged and unwaged work. Drawing on Baran and Sweezy, and 
compressing a great deal of analysis of poverty and class, new left theorists argued that – 
despite their ethnic diversity- “the poor were united by deprivation or near-starvation levels 
of income” (Gilbert, Gottlieb and Tenney, 1967, pp. 116-7). Whilst the “unity” of the poor 
was somewhat overstated, the basic insight remains sound. We can follow this approach and 
see America’s quasi welfare state as central to the management of poverty. Welfare provides 
a mode of bureaucratic control that disciplines those unable to commodify their labour.  
 
It is important to stress that this approach to poverty and alienation relates to the time and 
place studied in this book. A proper understanding of alienation and reification8 has to be 
sensitive to the complex assemblages that articulate modes of production.9 We thus draw on 
the work of Mészáros (1970), Ollman (1971) and Sayers (2011)—as it holds together the 
dialectical relationship of economics, society  and culture.10
  
Particularly useful in this respect 
is West’s understanding of Dewey as a major progressive philosopher (C. West 1987) – and 
the more general re-positioning of Marx as a philosopher rather than the dour ideologue of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
New Deal in fact failed as a “salvage operation.” It was only the war that dragged the country out of depression 
(Baran and Sweezy, 1966, pp.162-3). 
8
Recent scholarship has found in reification an understanding of a “stance” or an attitude of mind that can be 
understood as “empathetic engagement” or a “qualitative experience of interaction” (Honneth, 2008, pp 56, 57). 
We reify other people to the extent that we do not recognise them as human beings and, indeed, we suffer from 
reification to the extent that we forget or limit our own emotional responses to others. This re-orientation of the 
concept of reification stresses that it is necessary to re-read Lukács’Marxist understanding and also to observe 
the resonances between certain Heideggarian notions of care and Dewey’s arguments about experience. One 
important upshot of this argument is that it expands the meaning of reification beyond a narrow account of “the 
sphere of commodity exchange” and allows us to engage with a more sophisticated understanding of the interior 
effects of reification (Honneth, 2008, p.24).  
9 
A problem bedeviling the study of alienation has been the translation of the original terms used by Hegel and 
Marx. Entfremdung has been translated as estrangement but also carries the specific sense of alienation. In The 
1844 Manuscripts Marx argues that under the social conditions of a capitalist mode of production, one is 
alienated from Gattungswesen, “species-essence” or species being. Rather than offer an elaborate argument 
about this term, we will suggest that it can be associated with ‘being with’ (explained presently). This does not 
make Gattungswesen an understanding of a human essence, for reasons given in the text of this book. ‘Being 
with’ as Gattungswesen is our being with each other: our social being.  A second issue is the relationship of 
alienation to reification. This relationship will be explained in greater detail in the text. However, the following 
preliminary observations might be useful. Verdinglichung can be translated as ‘thingifying’ or turning 
something into a thing. Bringing these terms together, we get at the general idea that reification/ alienation are 
parts of a complex that can be understood as a failure to find oneself in the world. In alienation one’s response 
to the world (and sense of self) has become reified-  frozen out- no longer a process or a becoming; no longer 
experience in a meaningful sense. To get at this idea we need to look at what the word experience actually 
means. The root of the word is ‘per’: “to lead, pass over” which in turn can be linked to peritus- “tested”- even a 
reflexivity- the sense of testing the self- and perhaps into perius- peril- putting something at stake; risk, anxiety 
and living dangerously. It would seem, then, that the process of experience, of putting in question, of becoming 
an activist, is an opening of one’s self to experience and personal change. In very brief overview, our argument 
links together the notion of species being with an account of social recognition and ‘being with.’ Admittedly, 
this conjunction of terms is somewhat problematic- but it allows the critique of political economy to be linked to 
an account of social being and a notion of ethics and praxis.  
10 The contemporary reconstruction of Marx’s theory of alienation has the notion of system (or assemblage) at 
its core. This is perhaps one of the fundamental ideas behind Mészáros’ ground-breaking defence of the rigour 
of Marx’s theory of alienation, see Mészáros (2005).  
failed state socialism (C. West 1991).  It is important to appreciate the inherent complexity of 
alienation: one must study genealogies, intersections, combinations and mediations.
11
  
 
The most basic terms for understanding alienation are thus a concept of capitalist economy 
and a notion of consciousness.
12
 Consciousness is created and sustained in the dialectic of 
social recognition. Grasping consciousness will take us to terms that are definitional of 
socially recognised selves. Alienation describes the subtle way in which selves are 
constituted; inner and outer, body and soul folded together in the creation of a self-conscious 
thinking substance. As we will see, Du Bois’ understanding of race is of great relevance in 
defining a color line that runs through American culture and determines forms of racialized 
consciousness. Du Bois’ approach is based on a Hegelian insight: we are how others see us. 
Black philosophers have taken this theme very seriously and have shown how ideas of 
character and personality provide a structure for the study of alienation. These concerns run 
through our engagement with James Baldwin’s midnight fiction.13 They also connect with our 
reading of Unger and intersectional analysis.
  
In most basic
 
outline, character is a 
manifestation of self- a complex bound up with notions of action and social recognition; an 
insight most succinctly articulated by Marcel Proust: “our social personality is the creation of 
other people’s thoughts” - a sentiment with which Ellison’s invisible man might also agree 
(Unger,  1976, p.146). Bridging between Baldwin and Unger we will also suggest that 
recognition is a major component of Dewey’s social ethics.14 In other words, if we accept that 
                                                          
11 
This study of intersections and combinations is a form of genealogy. Rather than engage in a complex attempt 
to mediate the relationships between two seemingly antagonist traditions of social and political thinking, we will 
merely suggest one possible (and useful) point of agreement between Foucauldian or Nietzschean genealogy 
and studies in the spirit of Marx/ Hegel. Arguably both traditions are interested in the historical study of the 
forces that seize hold of phenomena. Depending on the play of forces, certain themes disappear or become 
obscured only to re-appear in a different configuration at a different historical juncture. As a form of critical 
history, genealogy brackets any notion of an ultimate telos. In terms of our arguments below, it should be clearly 
that our borrowings from Marx and Hegel do not require a closed history or a unified historical subject 
(Mészáros, 2005).  
12
As it would further complicate our thesis, these ideas are not developed through psychoanalysis. However, it is 
worth noting that psychoanalysis was important for new left thinking on alienation. For instance, in Eros and 
Civilisation, Marcuse drew on Fromm’s work to provide an account of “socio-psychological phenomena” or   
“... processes of active and passive adjustment of the instinctual apparatus to the socio-economic situation” 
(Marcuse, 1955, p. 241). The individual is trained to fit into society, to accept its codes and values as legitimate. 
Psychoanalysis finds this process playing itself out in the psyche- through the harnessing of primarily libidinal 
forces to what Marcuse called “economically structured relationships of domination and subordination” 
(Marcuse, 1955, p. 242). Social tensions manifest themselves as the level of individual psychic dis-function; 
outer antagonisms become inner antagonisms.  In The Sane Society, Fromm engaged explicitly with alienation 
in terms that resonate with ideas developed in this book. Alienation is a “mode of experience”, where a person 
becomes lost or “estranged” from him (or her) self” (Fromm 1955, p. 120.) These ideas area also important to 
Castoriadis’ treatment of alienation (although Castoriadis plays down the role of instincts). Like Marcuse, 
Castoriadis sees the unconscious as a social phenomenon: the internalization of an imaginary that defines both 
“reality and desire” for the subject. Alienation is “instituted” in this imaginary construction of reality. 
Psychoanalysis seeks to restore the “autonomy” of the subject- or- rather- to provide a form of “self-regulation” 
where the subject comes to understand the “construction” of the real (Castoriadis, 2005, p.103). Much more 
work would be necessary to provide a proper psychoanalytic understanding of alienation that could make the 
most of the different traditions of psychoanalytic thought (in particular the Lacanian elements of Castoriadis’ 
philosophy and their relationship to those of Marcuse). This demanding feat is not attempted in Lives that Slide 
Out of View.   
13 These themes are informed by black existentialism. Gordon’s (2014) understanding of “double 
consciousness”, drawn from the work of Du Bois, is central to the argument of this book. Cornel West’s work is 
compelling because it reads between black existentialism and other traditions of thought. Gines’ (2011) 
approach to intersectionality also feeds into the general approach to this term. See, in particular, chapter 10.    
14
 For William James “identity is only a loosely constructed thing”- something that exists “on the whole”- and 
which rests on the basis that whatever one is thinking, one is always aware of “my self” and “my personal 
these themes underlie both black and white radical thought (and LatCrit, which seeks to break 
out of this binary) we can begin to appreciate how different critical traditions have 
communicated with each other. Moreover, we can engage with the granular substratum of a 
particular mode of radical thought- with all its different nuances, tension and over-
determinations.   
 
Alienation is immanent to consciousness. One might posit a necessary alienation that is 
actually the condition of thought, the social form of consciousness that is bound up with the 
realisation of the self. Necessary alienation can be opposed to bad alienation. The latter term 
describes frozen or reified forms of consciousness that hold in place modes of recognition. 
These modes of recognition are themselves embedded in hegemonic ideologies structured by 
a capitalist mode of production. In the terms suggested above, hegemonic social and 
economic forms define pseudo realities that limit the creative human desire to transcend the 
limits of specific contexts. The critique of alienation proceeds dialectically to the extent that 
one can untangle one’s consciousness from the forms that it has assumed.15   
 
Philosophies of alienation are also accounts of praxis. Praxis overlaps with its nearest English 
cognate, practice, but rendering practice as praxis stresses that our concern is with particular 
forms of self-conscious practice that contest the terms of social recognition. This is a 
somewhat general definition, precisely because the contestation of social recognition must be 
studied in context. The development of these themes in the Marxist tradition has tended 
towards essentialism. For instance, from the perspective of Lukács’ History and Class 
Consciousness (1923), the proletariat are capable of becoming the subjects of history and 
destroying an alienating social, economic and political reality through the collective 
realisation of their own political agency as a class. Our understanding of praxis is much more 
modest.16 As we argue below, it actually parts company with classical Marxism. A proper 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
experience.” Self for James is thus “duplex”- partly knowing and known; grammatically the “I” and the “me.” 
However, the I which knows is neither “an aggregate” nor “an unchanging metaphysical entity like the Soul, 
or…transcendental ego”-  existing “out of time” (James, 1910, pp. 215-6). Such an approach is not unique to 
James. For example, in the work of Cooley the self is no more than what is “designated” by the first person 
singular and “something known to experience” (Cooley, 1902, p. 136). Cooley also talks of the “social self” or 
the “looking glass self.” Just as we have a visual sense of the self from looking in the mirror (a sense associated 
with feelings that the mirror reflects ‘my attributes’), the social self is the sense of what “I” seem to be in 
“another’s mind.” The looking glass self thus has three essential attributes: our imagination of how we appear to 
the other; our imagination of the other’s judgement and “some sort of feeling” that can range from “pride” to 
“mortification.” The worst thing for the social self is to “lack the support of the other.” Closed in on itself, the 
“I” becomes “unhealthy”- losers its “vigour and plasticity” and becomes reified (Cooley, 1902, p. 155-7).  
15 
Although we will not use the Hegelian term Spirit (for reasons outlined below) the presentation of the problem 
of social consciousness in The Phenomenology of Spirit provides the basic terms for our argument. Spirit can be 
understood as consciousness that, mediated by self-consciousness, underlies any individual act. Spirit is, then, a 
form of self-reflexivity which creates the self as a fold in thought where “I” appear to myself. Spirit is no more 
than the “plurality of distinct consciousnesses definitely existing” or the way in which reflexivity is a social 
phenomenon (Hegel, 1967, para 447). To put this slightly differently: self-reflexivity is both “for itself”, as it 
recognises itself in the rational acts of others and “in itself” to the extent that this recognition is a form of self-
consciousness. Hegel argues that the social world is constituted by consciousnesses relating to each other 
through their common productions. Marx elaborates this point, and argues at length in The Paris Manuscripts 
that any proper critique of Hegel requires an engagement with political economy. As Marx himself affirms: 
“[w]ithin the framework of speculation Hegel … makes distinctions that really grasp the vital point.” (Marx, 
1977, p. 665). It should thus be clear, even if only in outline, how Marx’s account of alienation both borrows 
from Hegel’s terms and locates them in a new context: a critique of political economy.  
16 
An account of praxis does not require a ‘theory of history’, absolute knowledge or a smooth dialectical circuit. 
If praxis is always a doing, then the theory that informs it is best thought of as clarification of the terms in which 
things are done. This approach borrows from Gramsci, Castoriadis and Cornel West. Praxis is understood as the 
reciprocal involvement of thought and action in particular historical contexts.  A particularly influential 
account of praxis should eschew readymade concepts. Praxis is best conceived as an ongoing 
work in progress, an infinite conversation.
17  
 
New left praxis can be traced back to forms of community organising and the politics of the 
civil rights struggle. We will be particularly concerned with the activism of the NWRO and 
the links between the new left and this late off shoot of the civil rights movement. In 
reconstructing the transport of ideas between activists from the SDS and anti-poverty 
militants we will argue that (at least for the former), John Dewey’s understanding of creative 
democracy was a major point of reference. Dewey’s engagement with themes around social 
recognition and alienation can be traced further back to the influence of Hegel on his work 
(and also his desire to develop a social ethics; a project that brings together Dewey and Jane 
Addams’ philosophy of activism). The understanding of alienation and praxis put forward by 
this book thus borrows from a line of thought that moves from Hegel to Marx, through 
Arendt and (in its American manifestation) to Dewey. It is worth stressing at this stage that 
ideas of alienation and praxis are not linked to a vulgar operation of dialectics. Rather than an 
immanent pattern working to an inevitable conclusion, dialectics describes thought struggling 
with itself; or, perhaps more precisely, thought grasping itself through reflection on social 
action. At this level there is an overlap between Dewey’s pragmatism, dialectics and 
contemporary understandings of intersectionality.  
 
Lives that Slide out of View does not seek to provide an elaborate philosophical defense of 
this thesis. Rather, our approach is based on the observation that certain philosophies overlap 
and can be used in similar ways. This argument takes us to the concept of intersectionality 
and to understandings of Critical Race Theory (CRT), feminism and LatCrit. Intersectionality 
is rooted in “the social movement politics of the 1960s and 1970s” (Collins, 2012, p. 443). It 
has a fundamentally dialectical organisation, focused on ideas of double-ness, hybridity and 
combination (without resolution). Our understanding of intersectionality relates back to the 
dialectical description of consciousness. Class, gender and race are fundamental to the 
positioning of selves within a socio-economic order. However, class, gender and race are 
open to creative re-appropriation that resist and redefine dominant norms. As Agnes Heller 
has pointed out “[i]t is not obligatory for every person to receive the world” in the way that it 
is given (Heller, 1984, p.19). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
statement of these themes, important for social movement theory, and for critical legal theory in general, is that 
of Laclau and Mouffe (2001). Lives that Slide Out of View departs from this text. Although our arguments 
follow a line that passes through Mouffe and Laclau, they connect with currents of thought that were not part of 
Laclau and Mouffe’s project.  Lives that Slide Out of View does not offer a ‘model’ of radical democratic 
practice. Theory, in this sense used in this book, is “the always uncertain attempt to realise the project of 
clarifying the world” (Castoriadis, 2005, p. 74). To elaborate this argument in detail would require extensive 
discussion of themes central to the philosophical tradition. Whilst we cannot provide anything like a detailed 
engagement with understandings of techne, episteme, phronesis and praxis inherited from Aristotle, we can 
suggest one important concern: different ways of acting have their own ways of working out how to achieve the 
goals they seek. The carpenter and the geometer have their own ways of going about things. It is not that we are 
compelled to a choice between “geometry and chaos” (Castoriadis, 2005, p. 72).  This does not mean that one 
cannot have a general account of praxis. It means that a general account of praxis is fairly useless when it comes 
down to doing something rather than writing or thinking about it abstractly.  
17 
In this respect Bernstein’s arguments are an important influence; particularly on the relationship between 
Marx, Dewey and Hegel. However, Bernstein’s position is mediated by an engagement with Gillian Rose. This 
encounter produces a different understanding of the line of thought coming out of Hegel and Marx. For Rose, 
dialectical philosophy does not result in coherence and redemption. It is the agonistic form of a kind of thought 
that attempts to grasp “the absolute”- or- the inter-relationship of different, but interlocking levels of social 
reality (Rose, 1981). In Rose’s later work, ethics is related to the difficulty of remaining in this broken middle. 
Our understanding of praxis moves through this engagement with intersectionality to open 
onto an encounter with an idea of ethics. How do these ideas fit together? Praxis creates, in a 
hesitant way, the new. It does not simply reproduce a “pre-established order”- a “stable, 
limited, dead artefact” (Castoriadis, 2005, p.77). A great deal could be said about this theme, 
but we want to concentrate on praxis as a work on the self. As will be explained later in the 
book, self carries the meaning of character or personality. Given the complexities of this 
theme, the following brief statement from Castoriadis will have to suffice. We are not 
concerned with the “absolute Self”- the “monad” that retains its core through “contact with 
others” (Castoriadis, 2005, p.77). Nor are we particularly concerned with Foucauldian 
notions of the work on the self. We are concerned with the self as the “active” agent that 
“constantly reorganises” itself throughout its experiences (Castoriadis 2002, p.106).  
Personality and self are therefore plastic; it is this plasticity that allows alienation to be 
instituted in the self, but also, for the self to realise its alienation.18  
The ethical charge of the theory of alienation is based on the assumption that life, one’s 
values and the roles that one plays, are not givens. You can change. Arguably this concern 
was part of the ideologies of engagement animating new left groups and those working for 
civil rights. Certainly for the former, living differently tapped into notions of creative 
democracy (and earlier ideas of social ethics that stressed the importance of working with the 
poor as a way of coming to know the self and its limits). The theme that we want to 
concentrate on has been well described by Katz (1982): how does one ‘become’ a poverty 
lawyer- especially when, as Sylvia Law has pointed out, lawyers “have a dangerous capacity 
to disguise political choices as technical givens” (Law, 1984, p. 426). How a professional life 
becomes dedicated to a way of “being and living” is a major theme of this book (Law, 1984, 
p. 428).  
 
The work on the self requires us to study a somewhat complicated relationship between 
‘middle class’ radicals and those with whom they worked: the problem of the “white ally.” It 
is important to stress that praxis is not based on some idea of ‘middle class’ leadership. A 
recurrent theme in philosophies of praxis, from Gramsci to Freire, is that praxis does not 
come out of teaching or the effect of gifted leaders or philosophers on the masses. Praxis is 
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A brief study of the etymologies of self, personality and character suggests interesting points of overlap 
between different but related concepts. The common sense meaning of all these terms relate to what is 
distinctive of an individual- but- going deeper reveals some intriguing mysteries. Personality can be traced back 
to Greek words meaning prosopon or mask. Congruent Latin words relate to persum (hand or face) and per se 
una, or self-containing. There is also a relationship with per-sonare:  to sound through.  This complex of 
meaning suggests something ‘put on’ that allows one to play a public role; a mask through which the actor’s 
voice can be heard. The Latin sense of ‘self-containing’ is a little strange in this context. If the general sense is 
one of persona or of a dramatic mask, then presumably what is ‘self-contained’ is the actor playing a role.  To 
be self-contained, then, is already to be double (Allport, 1937). Pushing this further, the idea of personality 
suggests a doubleness that is the public form of something that talks through a persona. The mask as a public 
face through which one talks is thus the way in which the actor appears to others. The face is thus not so much 
the otherness of the other, but way in which one becomes visible (even if there is something behind the role or 
the public face that is held back). Character comes from an entirely different etymology that can be traced back 
to the sense of scratching, marking or scraping. Character and personality can be linked together to the extent 
that they describe a defining trait; even if this trait is plastic and capable of change. Self, has a third line of 
derivation. Its earliest sense is that of a pronoun. At root, then, it is a grammatical term.  Character and 
personality exist in and through language and reflection. We cannot pursue the philosophical or psychological 
meaning of these terms in any great detail. Indeed, we can but allude to the Hegelian subject and the ego or 
subject of psychoanalysis. Our working thesis is that all these words offer different insights into the forms of 
embodied social reflexivity that define us as thinking and acting beings.   
found in communal endeavour (Gramsci, 2005, pp 333-343; Freire. 2017, pp 35-43). 
Reconstructing the myriad conversations and encounters between activists and poverty 
lawyers is impossible; the documents and texts used in the pages to come are mere proxies 
for countless intense, passionate meetings in streets, offices or on demonstrations, 
occupations and picket lines. Perhaps some talked about Marx, Ellul and Marcuse; 
undoubtedly others didn’t. However, it is indeed interesting that one of the most important 
statements of a philosophy of praxis stresses that one’s “personality” comes out of the 
“ensemble” of social relations into which one enters (Gramsci, 2005, p.352-3). You are who 
you hang out with.  
In the terms developed in Lives that Slide out of View, the ensemble of social relations that 
create and re-create one’s personality (one’s self and sense of values) is described as a form 
of ‘being with.’ ‘Being with’ (mitdasein) is a term developed in Heidegger’s Being and Time 
(1962). Contemporary understandings of mitdaesin can be traced to the influential philosophy 
of Jean-Luc Nancy, and the beginnings of a kind of ‘left Heideggarianism.’19 Identifying 
broadly with this ‘tradition’,  Lives that Slide out of View offers a creative appropriation of 
‘being with’, reading the term through references to Martin Buber, Louis Wolcher, Ed Sparer 
and William Stringfellow. In short, ‘being-with’ is used to describe the open- ended work on 
the self that is occasioned when one does things with others.
20  
Lives that Slide out of View 
                                                          
19 In brutal summary, Martin Buber’s work mediates between that of Hegel and Heidegger and provides one 
possible way forward for ‘left Heideggarianism.’ For the relationship between Buber and Hegel, see Hudson 
(2010) and Williams (2000). More precisely, Buber’s I-thou relationship can be seen as a critical elaboration of 
Hegel’s dialectic of recognition; and as a particularly interesting appropriation of Heidegger’s world of “the 
they” where, one might say, passion is replaced with the statistics, gossip, common sense and the management 
of information (Heidegger, 1962, p. 165). These themes are developed throughout this book. The jumping off 
point is Heidegger’s notion that the “information” which “comes in the night” is “nothing” (Heidegger, 1962, 
p.318). For Buber the encounter with the other cannot be understood as an exchange of information. In the they 
world there are no secrets worth knowing; the encounter places the secret in circulation (Buber, 1937, p.5). It is 
also worth noting at this point that there is no real engagement with Levinas in Lives That Slide Out of View. For 
Levinas’ position on Buber, see Bernasconi and Wood (2002). There is only a brief discussion of Levinas in 
chapter 9 of Lives That Slide Out of View. Any proper defence of this position would have to stage an encounter 
between alterity, and a notion of negative dialectics. Suffice to say that the understanding of the dialectic of 
recognition presented in this book does not lead to a community of same-ness and ethics remains in the trauma 
of the self’s relationship to the other. Developing this point in any detail would require an engagement with 
Levinas’ reading of Hegel, see Bernasconi and Critchley (1991). And a turn to the idea of negative dialectics in 
the work of Gillian Rose. Moscow, Athens and Jerusalem. Whilst there is a sophisticated critical, legal literature 
on Levinas, there does not appear to have been a great deal of scholarship on the relationship between Levinas 
and Buber. But, see Wolcher (2016) and (2005).  Essential works for understanding Levinas’ impact on critical 
legal theory are Douzinas (2000), Wolcher (2003), Diamantides (2006), Manderson (2007) and Stone (2016).  
20 
Being with- or Mitdasein- is an idea taken from Heidegger’s Being and Time (1962) and elaborated by John-
Luc Nancy (2000) and others. Within the terms of this book, ‘being with’ is linked to an understanding of ethics. 
This can be elaborated as follows. Mitdasein tells us something about Dasein. Dasein is untranslatable, but 
means something like ‘being there.’ Dasein tells us something about our social life. The “who” of Dasein is 
established through the way that Dasein lives. Dasein’s “who” can be defined by asserting that Dasein is “in 
every case I myself.” However, the “who” takes us towards the problematic of the others amongst whom Dasein 
lives; an issue inseparable from sense, meaning and language. The “who” of Dasein is the “primordial” fact that 
being is always being with others. Primordial, in this context, describes the fundamental structure of being: a 
being with, or even a being between others. There is at least some relation between this notion of being with and 
the account of social recognition: we are because we are with others. This understanding enables others to 
appear as a matter of concern to Dasein, and, arguably, allows some notion of ethics to be appropriated from 
Being and Time. This argument is set out in more length in Gearey (2012, pp20-21 and 150-167). It does not 
presuppose a true or authentic self (even though we use the latter term): only an anxiety that one can resist, or, 
attempt to articulate as some kind of ethical relationship in the sense of attempting to justify one course of action 
does not seek to give a full theoretical defence of this term; rather it sets out a provisional 
analysis of how ‘being with’ might be used; in particular, a valence of ‘being with’ that will 
be called ‘working with.’ The argument will take us to a certain understanding of the “white 
ally.” In summary the problematic of the “white ally” comes out of the politics of new left 
activism. Our critical approach takes us to questions of anxiety that re-frame the issues 
thrown up by the analysis of “the white ally.” We will argue that these anxieties are 
associated with the call of conscience
21
 and a practice of successful failure that informs the 
sensibility of the radical lawyer. 
22 
  
This range of references- this play of different themes and philosophical methods may seem 
somewhat idiosyncratic, but eclecticism is part of the legacy of the new left. In comparison to  
the somewhat austere modes of contemporary critical theory, the new left were happy to mix 
Marx with Dewey, Buber with Heidegger, Marcuse with Ellul; existentialism with 
phenomenology and Marxism.23 But why return to this moment? The answer is that 
contemporary theory has lost sight of its inheritance from the new left. A related problem is 
the presentation of certain false choices between post modernism (and identity politics; bad) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rather than another. An action is authentic if it appears to the deliberating self that it is the best way of dealing 
with the demands of one’s ‘being with.’ 
 
21 
This understanding is drawn from Being and Time, and there is a clear sense in which this analysis links with 
themes in understandings of alienation. Crudely, in the everyday world of the they, Dasein (or “us” to the extent 
that we question our Being) flees from itself, or fails to grasp itself. Dasein is anxious, and turns away from 
being in the world. Anxiety, as something in the world, has an enveloping quality, it is both “there” and 
“nowhere”; and this peculiar quality means that the world itself is that which Dasein is anxious about: perhaps it 
is the worldhood of the world that is the cause of anxiety; not so much “this” or “that” but the world in its 
entirety. Indeed, when anxiety dies down, one reflects that it was “really nothing” – but this “nothing” is the 
world itself (Heidegger, 1962, p.232). Anxiety discloses the world as world. But, although anxiety reveals the 
world, it also allows the world to slip away, and as such, produces a kind of singling out of anxious Dasein, 
which becomes “thrown back” on itself and can no longer fall away: “Anxiety individualises Dasein for its 
ownmost Being –in- the world.” If Dasein is to understand or interpret this experience, then, it must seek to 
“project” itself into its own possibilities. So, the most essential revelation of anxiety for Dasein is its own “being 
possible” (Heidegger, 1962, p.232). Dasein is confronted with the need for “choosing itself and taking hold of 
itself” This is described as a movement away from the public and the they, into the “uncanniness” which also 
exists as a possible mode of being.  
22
 Admittedly, this runs the Heideggarian notion of being with into the Hegelian notion of sittlichkeit. In outline, 
the argument works in the following way. In The Phenomenology of Spirit, ethics is bound up with sittlichkeit. 
Sittlichkeit can be realised only when individual consciousness is united with all other consciousnesses and thus 
finds its own reality reflected back to itself, to the extent that it is possible to say “I see them as myself, myself 
as them” (Hegel, 1967, p. 378). This is the “realm” of the “Social Order (Hegel, 1967, p. 375); or, the “essential 
substance of individuals in their independent reality” realised most completely in the “life of a nation” (Hegel, 
1967, p. 376). In the nation, the individual feels at home because the community has been produced through the 
“actions of [citizens].” Common life is expressed through the “laws” of the community (Hegel, 1967, p.377). 
Law is not experienced as something up and against which the individual finds himself. The laws give 
“expression” to the part of the individual in the social whole. The whole problem of ethics, for the critical legal 
traditions, is that this coherence of self, nation and law does not take place. Ethics become de-coupled from 
conventional norms- especially if these norms serve to deny being to certain groups within the national 
community. Thus, in a problematic inherited from the new left: self-understanding comes through activism in 
the cause of egalitarian politics. Our development of this problematic appropriates themes from Buber and 
Heidegger to articulate an ethics of encounters with others.  
23 
Within the context of the new left, Ellul’s ideas fed into a wider sense of “social and spiritual alienation” that 
was articulated in terms of a Christian existentialism (Rossinow, 1994, p. 319). Rossinow puts it well: 
“[e]xistentialism gave a name to feelings of meaninglessness and incoherence that some young white people 
sought to assuage, and that name was alienation. Christian existentialism searched for ways of replacing 
alienation with feelings of wholeness, authenticity and community” (Rossninow, 1994, p. 330). Existentialism 
stressed the need for action, especially if action was risky and came out of a crisis of personal belief. Action was 
precisely the way in which one tested oneself and affirmed one’s faith.   
and transcendental historical materialism (something like class politics; Marx and Lenin; 
good). This distinction is not sustainable. Perhaps the problems of contemporary theory have 
also come from the jettisoning of existentialism (or what is taken to be existentialism). This 
has made it difficult to understand why people act; and, indeed, how action is the communal 
making of the self. This is why themes drawn from contemporary black existentialist 
philosophy are so important for the thesis of this book.24 Black existentialism inherits at least 
one of the spirits of the new left. So, CLS (and indeed critical legal theory, if such a thing 
exists) should perhaps be understood as essentially bricolage. Lives that Slide out of View, 
then, is at an exercise in a way of thinking; a rhythm, an anxious amalgam of joyous despair.  
 
Before we embark on these arguments, it is worth a definition of poverty. Poverty is a mobile 
concept. The definition of a term relates to the forces that seize it at any given time. Our 
concern is thus with the mutations of a definition over a period stretching roughly from the 
early 1960s to the present day.
25
 We do not pretend to trace these mutations in great detail but 
we do try to follow the shifting political and economic circumstances in which the term is 
understood.  
 
Poverty and Activism  
 
Moving from a discussion of philosophy to an engagement with poverty and political 
activism is only strange if one sees philosophy as primarily an academic concern. Quite to the 
contrary, questions of poverty and activism can only be understood if framed through 
philosophy. It is, though, necessary to engage with the historical context of anti-poverty 
                                                          
24 Consider, for instance, Gordon’s notion of the situation at this point. The situation is the sense in which one is 
confronted by an “question” or “an inquiry” that raises a compelling matter of concern; a serious provocation of 
one’s “being in the world” (Gordon, 1997, p.3). The readings of Heidegger and Buber are particularly 
influenced by Gordon’s understanding of the situation.  
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The measurement of poverty is a complex and developing field of study. This footnote only gives some basic 
references. An important starting point is Michael Harrington’s estimation that there were between 40-50 
million living at “levels” below “those necessary for human decency” (Harrington, 1962, p. 4). Harrington was 
rather vague about the poverty line, arguing that it was “somewhere between $3,000 and $3,500 a year for an 
urban family of four” (Harrington, 1962, p. 4). Dwight MacDonald’s New Yorker review criticized Harrington’s 
“impressionistic” use of statistics whilst praising the “moral” elements of his argument (MacDonald, 1963). 
MacDonald’s point was that Harrington rightly identified the way in which manipulation of statistics could be 
used to conceal the reality of poverty, an argument similar to Rainwater’s understanding of the techniques used 
to neutralize responses to human suffering (Rainwater, 1967). Mollie Orshansky, whose work developed the 
poverty thresholds used for government research, offered a similar reflection on poverty statistics: "unlike some 
other calculations, those relating to poverty have no intrinsic value of their own” (Orshansky, 1967, p. 28). 
Harrington’s book certainly gave a sense of the scale of the problem and refuted Galbraith’s influential 
argument that poverty had more or less disappeared in the United States and existed only in isolated “pockets” 
or individual cases of personal misfortune or incapacity (Galbraith, 1958, p.62). Harrington also provided some 
sense of the composition of the population living in poverty- drawing attention to the rural and urban 
unemployed, the relationship between poverty and old age and the scale of black poverty.  We get a slightly 
different sense of the statistics from the 1962 report of the Conference on Economic Progress (CEP), a think 
tank committed to furthering public spending for economic growth. The CEP report estimated that in 1960 there 
were 77 million people living below the poverty line, which it set at between $4000 for a family of any size, and 
$3000 for an individual (Joint Economic Committee, 1959). Clearly, the extent and depth of poverty depends on 
how one defines the poverty line. From 1964, the official poverty level has been set by the Department of 
Agriculture (West, 1981, pp.41-2). In 1964 this gave $3, 220 a year for the minimum income of a family of four. 
On these figures 34 million people were below the poverty line.  Researchers for the NWRO argued that the 
Department of Agriculture figure for the poverty line was too low, as the median income was $7,500. The 
NWRO made use of figures based on publications from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS 
lower standard budget referenced the annual cost of living and was used to produce the figure of $4,000 as the 
minimum income for a family of four to “live in dignity, meeting all its basic needs.”   
activism. Our point, for the moment is not so much poverty lawyering (this is examined in the 
next two chapters) but grass roots organising around poverty and welfare. We will return to 
these issues in more detail in chapter 5, but, for the moment it is necessary to sketch out a 
general overview of the work of the NWRO and CWRO.  
 
The later phases of the civil rights struggle were significant in articulating a politics of 
poverty. Before his assassination, Martin Luther King had urged the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference to turn their attention to organising around economic justice. As the 
successes in achieving formal rights for African Americans did not appear to have made 
significant changes in their living standards, a movement for economic justice and poverty 
appeared to make sense. The Economic Bill of Rights gave shape to these arguments, and the 
mass protest camp in Washington lent it an organisational and social form. Despite the 
dispersal of Resurrection City, and the refusal of Congress to take up the Bill, the campaign 
did show that it was possible to sustain an alliance of poor people’s movements (Jackson, 
2007, pp. 245-329; Mantler, 2013, pp. 90-186).   
How can we conceive of the political agency of the poor? Oscar Lewis noted that whilst 
Marxists like Castro and Fanon grasped the revolutionary potential of the lumpen proletariat, 
his own studies suggested that “radical ideology amongst [those of] low income” could not be 
taken for granted (Lewis, 1969, p.195). This issue relates to a central theme in new left 
thought: “the [driving] issue [for] the development of a radical movement [was] the forging 
of a new identity” (Frost 2001, p.110). However, even those organisations like the NWRO 
who saw themselves as poor people’s movements were aware that the term carried a sense of 
stigma that did not well serve purposes of political mobilisation. Certainly anti-poverty 
organisers found that those groups that they thought could be identified as poor were held 
together (and divided) by rival forms of identification around ethnicity, language or locality. 
Whatever interests people shared by virtue of their poverty were often not enough to produce 
viable long term modes of political identification. For instance, the NWRO showed that it 
could organise black women on AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children), but it was 
much less successful in appealing to unemployed or poor men.  
 
Whatever the wisdom of using poverty as a political identifier, poverty has to be understood 
in the context of the restructuring of labour markets and the organisation of employment 
around divisions between gender and race. The operation of the welfare state is itself a 
significant factor in determining how these forces play themselves out. The interplay between 
these factors will be examined in chapter 5, but some salient points can be outlined by means 
of an introduction.
26 
Ideologies of work and gender play a significant role. Scholars have 
drawn attention to the shifts in understandings of motherhood and work that went on 
throughout the middle part of the twentieth century. The terms of the Social Security Act of 
1935 that related to AFDC were originally based on the ‘right’ of women not to seek 
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 Although black women made up the majority of rank and file members of the NWRO, and some of the 
leadership, in percentage terms, the ethnic breakdown of those groups in poverty showed that black women 
were not the majority. That willingness of black women to organise and take part in social protest has been 
explained by different ethnic understandings of femininity; but the influences of the civil rights movement must 
also be taken into account. Commentators have suggested that whilst white women tended to remain somewhat 
isolated and to see poverty as a matter of personal shame, black women were much more willing to take part in 
political action. Organisers frequently attested to the importance of the social networks that women had created. 
Such networks not only provided social support but were useful for mobilising welfare mothers. The greater 
willingness of black women to engage in social protest may also be explained by broader ideologies of black 
power. Certainly, there was cooperation between the NWRO and local branches of the Black Panthers.  
employment and to remain at home and look after their children. As women entered into the 
labour force in increasing numbers in the 1960 and 70s, it became harder to sustain this 
distinction between waged work and state benefits. Concerns around the sexual morality of 
welfare mothers and the ‘failure’ of the black family also fed into the sense in which AFDC 
provisions appeared to be responsible for the growth of welfare rolls and the social problems 
that were thought to stem from female headed households. Scholars of poverty stress that 
work incentives pressured women to find precarious “low paying dead end jobs” and largely 
ignored issues of child care and training (West, 1981, p. 88). 
A point of agreement between NWRO leader George Wiley, Frances Fox Piven and Richard 
Cloward was that dependency on welfare was a result of economic pressures. Asserting that 
all women should have the choice to work or to look after their families, NWRO activists saw 
that the real problem was to do with the paucity of jobs and the inadequate training provisions 
under the WIN (Work Incentive) programmes. However, NWRO ideologues did not believe 
that women on AFDC would become “economically mobile” even though the evidence 
suggested strong motivation and the desire to work (West, 1981, p. 89). Beulah Sanders, 
chair of the NWRO in the early 1970s, stressed the difficult situation that women were put 
into: working in low income jobs and paying for childcare. Hence, the only viable solution 
was a “right to life” or a minimum income guaranteed by the state.  Minimum income 
arguments were supported by redefining the very idea of work. Even though it was unwaged, 
child care was work-  as important and meaningful as waged employment. As Johnnie 
Tillmon put it: “women’s work is real work”- a right to minimum income would effectively 
be “wages for housework”- the productive task of “child raising and housekeeping” (West, 
1981, p. 91). We will return to these points in chapter 5.  
The Chicana Welfare Rights Organization  
The CWRO is somewhat side lined in histories of the welfare rights movement.27 The 
movement was a response to particular patterns of stigmatisation and discrimination visited 
upon Chicana welfare mothers.  A brief review of the literature on poverty amongst Latino/a 
communities suggests that there were distinct historical and cultural patterns that defined the 
cultural, legal and social experiences of these groups, and fed into the experiences of the 
CWRO. There was a growing sense of the need for political and communal organisation that 
                                                          
27
 See Bermúdez (2014); Mantler (2013) and Garcia (2014). The CWRO needs to be understood in the context 
of the Chicano movement more generally. The Chicano movement can be seen as animated by energies similar 
to the black civil rights struggle. It had distinct regional foci. In California, efforts were made by figures such as 
Ceasear Chevaz and Dolores Huerta to organise farm workers into a trade union. In New Mexico, Reies Lopez 
Tijerina agitated for land grants. Out of the Crusade for Justice, a civil rights organisation based in Denver, 
Rudolfo ‘Corky’ Gonzalez emerged as a main mover in Chicano student organisation and the militancy that fed 
into the East Los Angeles high school ‘blow outs.’ Another central feature of the Chicano movement was the 
formation of the La Raza Unida, active in Texas, California and Colorado. Inspired by black nationalism, this 
political party enjoyed considerable success between 1970-8, contesting municipal and gubernatorial elections 
and developing alongside its electoral campaigns, grass roots movements and an increasingly revolutionary 
ideology. In the later phase of its operations, La Raza Unida made much of the notion of Aztlán – a semi mythic 
notion of a homeland stretching between Mexico and Texas-and- for some- the justification for a new nation: 
República del Norte. 
would deal with problems of discrimination and marginalisation suffered by Mexican 
American and other Latino/a communities throughout the United States.
28  
Latino/a poverty is bound up with patterns of immigration from the Caribbean, Southern and 
Central America. It is arguably the case that immigration tends to be seen from the 
perspective of white immigration from Europe (Moran, 1997). Whilst white immigrants were 
‘invited’ to live and work in the United States, and expected to commit to its cultural norms, 
Latin immigration was different: for instance, in the first years between 1940 and 1950, the 
majority of Mexicans who came to America did so as either “temporary contract workers” or 
“without documents” (Moran, 1997, pp. 117-8). Lacking the correct documents for 
citizenship, immigrants existed in a twilight world of informal work and limited 
opportunities. Despite relatively high levels of work force participation, employment 
opportunities were concentrated in low waged, precarious jobs (Reyes, 2004, pp. 42-3).  
These are, of course, snapshots of broad historical patterns. Experiences of Latino/a poverty 
are culturally differentiated. For example, the welcome shown to Cuban refugees in the 1960s 
contrasts with the hostility shown to those from Guatemala or San Salvador in the 1980s- and 
later- that of Mexicans in the 1990s (Iglesias and Valdes, 1998, p.29). Latino/a cultures are 
also further articulated around “hetero patriarchal” norms that condition and affect ways in 
which poverty is experienced and perceived (Iglesias and Valdes, 1998, p. 31). Thus, it would 
be wrong to homogenise Latino/a experiences of poverty and to ignore the role that class, as 
well as race, gender and sexual orientation play in the construction of particular experiences 
of poverty (Iglesias and Valdes 1998; Hernandez 2000). Echoing Harrington, Latinos/as are 
“forgotten Americans” whose status as “outsiders” within the polity is, at least in part, 
defined by their poverty (Johnson, 1997, p.135).
29 
  
To study the Chicano/Chicana Movement is to examine a particular form of Latino/a 
radicalism. The Chicano/a community sees itself as an indigenous people of North America. 
The dispossession of La Raza from lands straddling what became the Mexican/US border, 
lends a specific quality to their politics, and, indeed, opened up cooperation between 
Chicano/a groups, and American Indian activists around poverty activism. Most notably 
black, Chicano/a and participants in the American Indian Movement (AIM) came together at 
the Alianza Conference in 1967, but failed to agree a coordinated programme of action 
(Mantler, 2013, p. 67).  Some stressed that poverty was primarily related to jobs and income, 
others saw poverty in term of marginalised cultural heritage, land and fishing rights (Mantler, 
2013, p. 87). Given limitations of space, we cannot pursue an analysis of AIM, and our 
engagement with Latino/a struggles is, of necessity, rather narrowly engaged with the 
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Westminster 161 F.2d 774; 1947 U.S. App showed that Mexican Americans could be protected from 
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Census data from 2014 shows that Hispanic earnings remained well below the median. Other indicators of 
poverty and low waged work, such as receipt of welfare benefits, food stamps and poor health insurance, also 
suggest that Hispanic groups experience poverty with greater frequency than white groups – although black 
poverty remains most marked in recent national figures. Nearly a quarter of the Hispanic population of the 
United States are living in poverty (with evidence that this is in work poverty) with a strong correlation between 
poverty, disadvantage and those who were born outside the US. Hispanic women figure disproportionately in 
the statistics: they earn much less than white women, and much less than Hispanic men. See 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/04/19/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-united-states/ and 
https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/96c9cbb5-d206-4dd5-acca-955748e97fd1/jec-hispanic-report-
final.pdf. 
CWRO. The CWRO ultimately has to be seen as an expression of a particular form of 
political sensibility that- whilst sharing a great deal with black struggle, assumed its own 
forms and dynamic.
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Overview of the Book 
We now want to map the development of the book over the remaining 9 chapters.  
Chapter 2 examines a number of intellectual traditions that were to influence lawyers 
involved in the war on poverty. One tradition that fed into later activism came out of the new 
left’s adaptation of ideas whose origins can be found in the work of John Dewey and Jane 
Addams. At the heart of Dewey and Addams’ work are profound ethical questions about how 
one acts and how one is orientated to the world. In following these issues through we will 
sketch out a more general understanding of the character of the radical lawyer at odds with 
the disconnection between professional work, politics and life. Tracing these themes forward 
from Dewey and Addams, we will be particularly interested in the ideology of Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS) activists involved in Economic Research and Action Projects 
(ERAP) and at a later point with the work of activists involved in the war on poverty. From 
the former, we will see how important practices of participatory democracy were in 
community organising work. From the latter we will be particularly concerned with how 
those lawyers and organisers linked with Movement for Youth (MFY) in New York City 
understood their work. Activists concentrated on the everyday challenges of working with the 
poor; activities requiring self-examination and personal transformation.  
There is, however, a difficult question to ask about the nature of this radicalism. To what 
extent could white activists understand the reality of lives lived in poverty? This is the 
leading edge in an argument that addresses the problem of the “white ally.”  
We will use the idea of the “white ally” (a term so contested that it must appear in quotation 
marks) to explain certain tensions in new left politics. Taking some orientating points from 
Marcuse’s critique of the new left, we will suggest that Martin Buber’s philosophy of the 
encounter, also influential in activist circles, offers a way forward; an engagement with the 
difficulties of working with others towards a shared goal. However, Buber’s philosophy 
needs to be supplemented with themes from Fanon, Du Bois and Newton.  The problem of 
alliance across the poverty line and the colour line (to say nothing of the gender line) moves 
towards our understanding of the broken middle, a term that will be introduced in this chapter 
but not developed properly until the end of the book. The notion of the broken middle will be 
used in chapters 9 and 10 to frame the sense of poverty law theory as a radical open-ness: a 
creative and anxious praxis that informs social justice projects and working with the poor.  
Chapter 3 continues to trace the philosophies that fed into anti-poverty activism and extends 
the argument to the reception of these ideas by the Critical Legal Studies movement. The 
chapter begins with a recap of some key themes around SDS organising with particular 
reference to ERAP. The chapter follows these concerns into the work of Ed Sparer. Sparer 
drew on Hegel, Marx and Buber to provide one of the first consistent attempts to theorise a 
radical account of poverty law. Sparer also picked up on and developed themes relating to 
movement lawyering and ethical praxis. However, his ideas largely failed to enter into the 
mainstream of CLS. The end of the chapter is an exercise in reconstruction that reads back 
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Whilst the movement was briefly affiliated to the NWRO, and, indeed, both the NWRO, and Chicano/a 
activists (as well as Puerto Rican and American Indian groups) participated in the Poor Peoples’ Campaign in 
1968, a “rainbow alliance” was not forthcoming. 
from later CRT scholarship and feminist accounts of alienation to sketch out a theory of 
social ethics that the crits failed to develop. This will be presented as an account of the 
consciousness of the poverty lawyer working with poor clients and open to social and 
personal transformation.  
 
In chapter 4, we turn from the crits to progressive constitutional theory and examine another 
split in poverty law theory. The chapter begins with Michelman’s analysis of the 14th 
Amendment and his adaptation of Rawls’ moral philosophy to provide a theory of 
constitutional welfare rights. We then turn to study Michelman’s re-working of his position 
around republicanism. The final parts of the chapter weigh up Michelman in the light of more 
recent radical constitutional scholarship.  
 
Chapter 5 returns to the crits and examines that way that we can creatively respond to the 
legacy of NWRO and CWRO militancy. We will work with three key terms: the social 
reproduction of capital, reification and poverty. These terms are rooted in the insights of the 
ClassCrit ‘turn to Marx’- a moment in which certain legacies of 1960’s poverty activism re-
enter contemporary critical thought. Linking Piven and Cloward’s work with ideas of 
reification, the chapter argues that the NWRO can be understood as resting on a street 
philosophy of social recognition that rejects the reifying determinations of class, race and 
gender. We will read these themes into studies of Alicia Escalante, Johnnie Tillmon, Jeanette 
Washington and Beulah Sanders, leading figures in the welfare rights movement. Their work 
offers a principled and articulate response to the alienation and reification brought about by 
the social reproduction of capital. The chapter concludes with a final question: what did the 
NWRO mean for activist lawyers? Answering this question takes us to chapter 6. 
 
In chapter 6, we engage with the work of William Stringfellow, and themes of vocation, 
conscience and freedom. These ideas are central to the fundamental problematic of the 
engaged lawyer involved in social struggles. We propose to follow Sparer’s promptings and 
to open a dialogue between Buber and Stringfellow. This raises questions about Heidegger’s 
influence. In Stringfellow’s writing we can find the outline of an account of ‘being with’ or 
caring for the fate of the poor. We will see that Stringfellow’s concept of ‘being with’ the 
poor is rooted in his Christian faith. However, whilst one can aid and sympathise with others, 
one cannot stand in the other’s place. The question thematised by Stringfellow and performed 
through ‘being with’ is thus an assumption of responsibility from within radical freedom. One 
does not need to respond, to work with the poor or be alongside them. ‘Being with’ the poor 
is a path that is chosen as a vocation, a calling of conscience. To answer the call of 
conscience, one must be involved in the travails everyday life, even if the proximity to 
poverty occasions a certain anxiety about one’s own commitment and motivation.  
Elaborating this theme takes us to the new poverty law scholarship in chapter 7. Most critical 
accounts of the new poverty scholarship stress its concern with the power relationship 
between lawyer and client. There is something about the nature of poverty law that means the 
lawyer’s relationship with his/her client is distinct from that of corporate, commercial or 
business relationships.  As White has pointed out, the plaintiffs in celebrated welfare cases 
rarely met the lawyers that represented them once the depositions had been filed (White, 
1987, p. 536).  However, this problematic conceals another way in which the new poverty 
law can be understood. Our approach stresses the way in which the new poverty law 
scholarship can be read as inheriting and carrying forward an ethics of anxiety. In chapter 8, 
we will go on to show how the ethics of anxiety are bound up with a legacy of the new left 
and CLS that cast a long shadow over law and activism in the decades between 1980 and 
2017.  
The final parts of chapter 8 argue that LatCrit is the inheritor of new left ideas on poverty, 
democracy and praxis. This is precisely why LatCrit offers such an important perspective on 
critical legal theory. Praxis is understood as a form of intellectual cooperation with “activists” 
and other “outside scholars” (Valdes, 2002, p. 102). But praxis is also an orientation to 
LatCrit’s own positioning in the critical legal tradition. LatCrit stresses that critical legal 
theory is a work in progress; a self-critical reworking of the jurisprudential tradition- as well 
as an investigation of its own identity. A long way from a form of identity politics, LatCrit 
eschews essentialisms and concentrates attention on the play of forces that define 
phenomena, and, indeed, can bring about social change. Sylvia Law put this it well: “legal 
doctrines” are changed only through “larger change in social organization and consciousness” 
(Law, 1984, p. 426). In bringing these themes together, we hope to suggest a somewhat 
different way in which we can understand the future of critical legal theory.  
 
Chapters 9 and 10 seek to show how the concept of ‘being with’ the poor relates to the 
sensibility of the radical lawyer.  To describe this radical open-ness we will make use of 
Rose’s ‘concept’ of the broken middle.  
The work of the broken middle presupposes no final answers, fixed identities or final 
resolution of its informing tensions.  
The broken middle of poverty law gives onto the anxious practice of critical legal theory. 
 
 
 
